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Abstract 
This bachelor thesis investigates how the implementation of water resource 
management promote an institutional design that can create lasting change. It is a 
case study of the Mara River Basin Initiative in Kenya and Tanzania, where great 
efforts have been taken to combat water related problems. The national 
governments have delegated the operational responsibilities to local water users’ 
groups, which are in charge of administering the policies locally. Rules are also in 
place, punishing pollution or over-usage of water by tariffs. By using the 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, 
the structure of the water institutions are analysed. I am able to describe the 
institutional structure of the project, and through the framework also determine its 
institutional stability. It is concluded that many of the actions taken are in line 
with Ostroms’ thoughts, and that it very well can be applicable to other water 
management projects. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aim of the Study and Research Question 
The aim of this study is to analyze how the institutional design affects the 
sustainability of water resources management, or rather what institutional 
structures needs to be in place in order for water management policies to sustain 
in the long run. My research question is as follows: 
How does the implementation of Integrated Water Resource Management 
policies promote a sustainable institutional design? 
In order to answer this question, I will analyse a river basin management 
program in Kenya and Tanzania, using Elinor Ostroms’ Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework. By “sustainable institutional design” I mean an 
institutional structure that according Ostrom would be self-sustaining. After 
performing the analysis on the case of interest, I hope to be able to draw 
conclusions that might make it useful for the continuing study of water resources 
management.  
1.2 Integrated Water Resources Management 
Water is essential for the survival of every living being on this planet. Where I 
live it is not common to reflect over the abundance it means to have clean, 
always-accessible running water, and the absolute luxury it is with the long hot 
showers in the morning. In many parts of the world there is severe water scarcity, 
which leaves people thirsty since they can’t drink, hungry since they cant cook, 
and dirty since they can’t wash. Places were the rain doesn’t fall for months on 
end, where crops won’t grow, and where the only water that exists is of such bad 
quality, that it is outright dangerous to consume it. 
Countless international efforts have been taken to combat water shortages. 
Integrated Water Resources Management is another one – one that gathers them 
all under one roof, to find a common strategy on how to deal with water issues. It 
is a “process which promotes the coordinated development of water, land and 
related resources in order to maximize economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems 
(GWP 2010)”. It is a cross-sectoral approach, in which public and stakeholder 
participation in the formulation, implementation and maintenance of policies is 
often an important part. In this thesis I will mostly refer to it as IWRM, or simply 
WRM. 
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2 Theory 
The Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
 
2.1 Common-pool resources and the IAD framework 
A common-pool resource (CPR), such as the water in a river, is a resource not 
owned by anyone and therefore jointly accessible to all individuals in its 
proximity. When a CPR is subtractive, meaning one users consumption decreases 
the amount which is available to others, scarcity occurs, which in effect leads to 
the degradation of the environment. This phenomenon is what is generally known 
as the Tragedy of the Commons. Political scientist Elinor Ostrom argued that the 
key to making sure that usage of a resource is allocated sustainably, is an 
institutional arrangement that specifies how much of the resource each individual 
is allowed to use and how often (Ostrom 1990, p. 2). It is important that this 
system is fair, efficient and enforceable in order to make sure it is maintained and 
that there are no free riders (Ostrom 2007, p. 40-42).  
As a theoretical framework for this thesis, I use the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework, which hopefully provides the analytical tools for 
adequately answering my research question. The IAD framework, which was 
developed by Elinor Ostrom, focuses on how institutions affect the collective 
behaviour of individuals (Ostrom 2007, p. 21), and is commonly used when 
assessing how common pool resources are being managed. Water being a 
common resource, making an institutional analysis of an IWRM initiative is 
therefore suitable. 
 
2.2 Institutions as rules-in-use 
In the IAD framework, institutions are defined as “the shared concepts used by 
humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies”. Since 
this definition of institutions does not necessarily refer to written rules or laws, but 
merely shared concepts, one of the greatest challenges when studying institutions 
is to identify and measure them. In order to make this distinction easier, the 
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analytical focus is on rules-in-use, meaning the set system of behavioural rules 
practised in a community (Ostrom 2007, p. 23).  
Rules are shared understandings amongst people about what actions are 
required, prohibited, or permitted. Much of these rules occur as individuals meet 
to solve a problem through collective action. Rules guiding our everyday life have 
different sources, and come in different shapes. In addition to formal legislation 
and regulations of the central government, agencies on all levels of society can 
make laws, and corporations and voluntary organizations can influence the rules 
that people follow in their day-to-day actions and interactions. One step to take, in 
order to make a deeper analysis of the institutions behind our actions, is to 
understand the working rules – the set of rules individuals would refer to if asked 
to justify their actions – that are used when making decisions. The stability of 
rules and laws are dependent on the shared meaning assigned to the words used to 
describe them. If there is no shared meaning of the words, confusion will arise 
about what actions are required, permitted, and forbidden (Ostrom 2007, p. 36-
37). When individuals in a community have a shared set of values, they are also 
more likely to develop rules to combat a common resource-problem, as well as 
more likely to follow them (Ostrom 2007, p. 43). 
Analysis of decision-making situations are made on three levels, in a 
somewhat hierarchical system, in the IAD framework. The constitutional, the 
collective-choice, and the operational level are all nested within one another. 
Rules that specify what individuals can and cannot do are on the operational level. 
What can be decided on the operational level is, on the other hand, stipulated by 
the collective-choice rules, and the collective-choice rules are themselves 
constrained by the constitutional rules. Rules on all three levels are needed in 
order for a collective endeavour at the local level to operate. Due to the 
intertwined levels of rule-making, crafting rules that decide the dealings of 
individuals is not necessarily the privilege of the government; an individual can 
make both collective and constitutional choices (Lam 2011, p. 509). 
2.3 The Action Arena 
When analyzing, explaining or predicting behaviour within a certain institutional 
arrangement – will I will do in this thesis – the first step is to identify the action 
arena. This arena is the social space where individuals interact – for example to 
solve problems, or exchange goods and services – and consists of an action 
situation and the actors who are a part of this situation (Ostrom 2007, p 28). The 
actor in a situation can both be a single individual and a number acting as one, 
like a corporate actor. In order to describe the structure of an action situation, 
seven variables are commonly used. I will illustrate the action situation using the 
action arena of  a river basin management initiative:  
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• The set of participants – who and how many use the river? 
• The positions – what different positions are there to be filled by 
participants? On what levels are decisions made and by who? 
• The set of allowable actions – what rules does the water initiative 
consist of and how do they affect the outcome? 
• The potential outcomes – what region and what events are affected 
by the actions of participants? 
• The level of control over choice – do participants take the intended 
actions or can they choose not to? 
• The information available – how much information do participants 
have about the structure of  the action situation? 
•  The cost and benefits – how costly or beneficial are various actions 
to the outcome? 
 
By finding the structure of the action situation in a problem-solving process, 
the hope is to find regularities in human actions (Ostrom 2007, pp. 29-30). The 
term action refers to human behaviour, and the hope is to be able to predict the 
behaviour of actors in certain situations. By looking at the institutional structure 
surrounding an IWRM initiative, it is possible to predict how actors will behave in 
that particular setting, and by aggregating their behaviour it is possible to make 
predictions of the outcome of the collective actions (Ostrom 2007, pp. 30-33).  
Actors are presumed to have incomplete knowledge of alternative actions and 
their likely outcomes. It is often the case that institutions can help improve 
knowledge, and create incentives for making decisions that are collectively 
beneficial. Because of the lack of perfect knowledge, often actors do not know 
how their usage of a resource is affecting others negatively, or that they are 
interdependent of one another. Creating institutions make actors aware of these 
things, and them people look beyond their self-interest and find an arena for 
collective action (Lam 2011, pp. 510-511). The goal of a common-pool resource 
management program is to make the collective actions needed to solve the 
problem become institutionalized, which creates a self-sustaining institutional 
structure.  
2.4 Analysing outcomes 
In the IAD framework, governance of the commons is an ongoing process. In 
order for it to work effectively, it takes an institutional design that ascertains the 
continual contributions by participants. Elinor Ostrom has identified eight 
principles of institutional design for successful common-pool resource 
governance:  
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• The boundaries of the resource should be clearly defined, as well as 
what groups and individuals get access to the resource. 
• Rules should correspond with physical conditions and local needs. 
• Arrangements should be in place to ensure that those affected by 
rules can participate in modifying them. 
• Monitoring of the behaviour of users should be carried out by 
community members. 
• The use of graduated sanctions should apply for rule violators. 
• There should be accessible mechanisms at hand for solving conflicts. 
• The right of the users to their own institutions should be guaranteed. 
• Responsibilities should be shared in a nested system of multi-level 
governance of the common in question. 
 
Institutions that have these characteristics are better equipped to provide 
incentives for users of a common resource to, continuously set rules-in-use for 
effectively governing the CPR (Lam 2011, p. 510).  
When evaluating the outcome of an institutional arrangement, it is also good 
to look at other criteria. Economic efficiency, fiscal equivalence and 
redistributional equity all have to do with changing the allocation of resources. 
Are the benefits of a project at an economically optimal level, will actors get back 
what themselves contributed, and will the resources be redistributed in a fairer 
way in order to raise the standard of living for poorer individuals? These three are 
not completely compatible with one-another, and trade of between them have to 
be made (Ostrom 2007, p. 33). Implementing user-costs for using a resource, 
sanctions for not following the rules, or incentives for following them is a good 
way to make sure that the users follow through with their engagements, and at the 
same time would help increase economic efficiency. For the poorest members of 
society user costs are not an option – the collective action incentive has to be 
strong, but still equitable. As mentioned before, external monitoring and 
enforcement activities is also favourable in order to make sure the institutional 
arrangement is strong enough (Ostrom 1990, p. 16-17).  
When evaluating an institutional arrangement, it is also necessary to look at 
the accountability of officials to citizens involved. This, as well as efficiency and 
equity, is hopefully increased if the institutional arrangement make sure the 
officials are informed of the preferences of citizens. Whether the institutions 
dealing with a CPR comply with general morality is another subject to evaluation. 
Is there a system in place for detecting actors who wish to cheat for their personal 
gain, and is there a system for rewarding people who follow through with their 
obligations? Lastly, adaptability to changes in the environment, such as natural 
disasters, is crucial in order for a institutional arrangement to be sustainable over 
time (Ostrom 2007, pp. 34-35). 
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3 Methods 
 
3.1 Choice of subject, theory and unit of analysis 
In this study I investigate the foundations for successful implementation of water 
resources management. Water being a common-pool resource, I find Elinor 
Ostroms institutional analysis and development framework to be a useful 
theoretical tool for evaluating IWRM policies. As for finding a unit of analysis, it 
is very important for it to be carefully selected. Since the purpose of my study 
partly is to answer if IWRM implementation creates a sustainable institutional 
design, it is important that the case could be seen as representative for IWRM 
projects (Teorell, Svensson 2007, p. 83). I see the Mara River Basin Management 
Initiative as suitable, since the project is very well documented. It is also a very 
large project, which makes it possible for a wide-ranging implementation of 
IWRM on all levels. 
According to my knowledge, an institutional analysis of an entire IWRM 
project like this one has not been done. Elinor Ostrom has done multiple studies 
on irrigation systems in small villages, but it has not been done with a policy that 
incorporates all aspects of IWRM. So therefore, why not see the study as an 
introduction to the institutional analysis of integrated water resources 
management as a whole. Hopefully, it results in a meaningful analysis that 
explains how water institutions affect the sustainability of IWRM policies. 
3.2 The Case Study 
I have chosen to conduct a single case study for this thesis. The case study is 
the methodological approach of gathering enough information about a particular 
event, policy or manifestation of a phenomenon in order to effectively understand 
how it functions (Berg 2001, p. 225). A qualitative study aims to understand every 
phenomenon in society from its own individual context. By choosing only few 
units of research it is possible to take many different factors of explanation into 
account when trying to analyze a certain phenomenon (Teorell, Svensson 2007, p. 
11).  
The study of few cases is used when the researcher want to thoroughly analyse 
a subject, going under the surface to try and find answers. Sometimes, criticism is 
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directed at the case study method because of its presumed lack of generalizability 
(Yin, 2007, p. 17). It is argued that looking at only a few units of analysis would 
make it unscientific. In my opinion, this does not apply to this study. Although 
renowned researchers such as Elinor Ostrom have both time and resources to 
conduct studies which are both extensive in scope and intensive in precision, it is 
very rare to have those resources. In this study, it is my firm conviction that by 
applying the theoretical framework in use on only one case, more can be said 
about the possibilities for lasting and effective water resource management. As 
long as the case in question is thoroughly chosen, and the amount of collected 
data is enough for a in-depth analysis, mixing in more cases to this study would in 
my opinion not necessarily help answering the question. The case study stands for 
itself, but I believe that finding patterns could lead it on. I hope to make a 
compelling case that is also applicable on other similar cases. The goal in a case 
study is to achieve analytic generalization which means being able to generalize 
theories – not to achieve statistical generalization (Yin 2003, p. 10). 
 Had I made a quantitative study trying to answer this same question I could 
probably only have used two or three variables of explanation. Since gathering 
much information about large quantities of study objects is very time consuming, 
quantitative studies are often used to test a theory on a causal mechanism between 
a dependent and independent variable (Teorell, Svensson 2007, p. 182). At the 
same time, it is important to realize that I most likely would not have gotten the 
same results from a study conducted with a quantitative method. There is no need 
for a case study to also be a qualitative study. Many case studies have elements of 
both, and some are purely quantitative. The question of whether you prefer a 
qualitative or quantitative study, rather has to do with philosophical beliefs (Yin 
2003, p. 15). I for one believe that a qualitative study will in many cases (at least 
this case) give the best results. It is a complex world we live in, with so many 
factors influencing every single event or action – that trying to gain knowledge of 
why or how things happen by isolating the very few variables of explanation 
needed to complete a quantitative study is painting a picture of a world without 
greyscales. Such a world does no exist.  
This case study has an explanatory ambition. In most studies in political 
science, casual connections are complex, and hard to isolate and measure (Yin, 
2007, s. 150). Many factors a part from institutions play a role in the sustainability 
of common-pool resources policies, and one can never be certain beyond doubt of 
an answer in social sciences. By defining key concepts, and by conducting a study 
that is focused, theory-connected, and approached in a systematic manner, the 
idea is that fallacies can be ruled out to a high degree (Yin 2003, p. 21). It is my 
opinion that this study follows these core principles. Additionally, two questions 
are important to ask when conducting a case study: First, has the researcher made 
too many subjective decisions in order to get to his conclusions for them to be 
truly objective? Second, does the study offer information that can be as useful 
beyond the individual case (Berg 2001, p. 231)? When it comes to the question of 
objectivity, every researcher makes subjective choices the research process. The 
real question here is rather about replicability, would another researcher 
conducting the same study get the similar results? In my opinion, I am open about 
  8 
every step on the way in this study, discussing the different choices I’ve made in 
order for anyone to follow the line of thought. The second question is a matter of 
generalizability (Berg 2001, p. 232). For some this is not a question of interest, 
but as I said before, I do believe that it is possible to produce meaningful 
knowledge on a more general level. It is my belief that IWRM management issues 
are similar in many different settings, and that doing thorough research on one big 
project can also contribute to the understanding of others. 
3.3 Data collection 
In order to get a more substantive picture of reality, it is useful for researchers to 
use multiple sources of evidence, and more than one data-gathering technique 
through so called triangulation (Yin 2003, p. 97). When initially starting this 
project, a triangulation approach was my intention. I have not however been able 
to get in touch with people with first-hand information on my case of study. 
Proceeding with the study anyway might not be optimal, but it is my opinion that 
the empirical background for my analysis is adequate, and that my conclusions are 
scientifically relevant. It could be seen as an obvious flaw of this study, that the 
data-gathering only consists in reports and writings from NGOs and such, and no 
first-hand sources such as expert- or participant interviews. There lies a threat to 
validity that I have to keep in mind when performing the actual analysis, making 
the need for careful considerations of every conclusion drawn even more stressing 
than usual (Berg 2001, p. 6). Concluding this section, I want the reader to bear in 
mind that it is answering of questions through the application of systematic 
procedures - not simply the gathering of data - that is the purpose of conducting 
research. As long as my analysis is structured, valid and reliable, and I hold 
myself accountable for any errors, my question can be considered sufficiently 
answered (Berg 2001, p. 5). It is possible to do a valid high-quality case study 
without leaving the library (Yin 2003, p. 11).  
As I mentioned previously, one of the reasons I chose to analyse the Mara 
River Basin management initiative, is because of the amounts of accessible 
information. Compared to many other of the IWRM projects I’ve encountered, it 
is possible to retrieve written sources from many different organizations regarding 
the same water initiative, which should increase the validity of the project. Much 
of the data is however extracted from the Norad and WWF evaluation report on 
the Mara River Basin management initiative. Letting one source take up a too big 
part of a study is problematic out of many reasons. If the author is biased and 
selectively collects data, or produces the report for a specific purpose and a 
specific audience, it might not be ideal for the basis of a scientific analysis (Yin 
2003, p. 86). I will however defend my selection – the report is written by three 
scholars in different fields of study, with extensive experience in water 
management policies. Also, they are not themselves employees of the WWF. The 
fact that I have all these written sources of data gives me a broad overview, which 
covers many events and settings, and is stable and easy for any reader to access. 
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4 Background 
The Mara River Basin Management Initiative 
4.1 The Mara River problem structure 
The Mara River is a river in East Africa that originates in the Kenyan highlands 
and drains out into Lake Victoria in Tanzania. The river basin covers an area of 
approximately 13,750 km2, of which 65% is on the Kenyan side of the border. 
The river basin supports over one million people, and many rely on the river for 
drinking water even though the quality is poor (WWF 2010). During dry seasons 
scarcity occurs, and conflicts over water tend to arise. A part from poor water 
quality and quantity, there is a general environmental degradation which threatens 
biodiversity and the livelihoods of people living in the area. The nature and 
wildlife is of global conservation significance, and attracts many tourists, which 
also makes it of great economic importance. The causes of the problems are 
many; over-abstraction of water resources due to an  ever-increasing demand, 
unsustainable agriculture, deforestation, pollution, poor infrastructure, and weak 
legal and institutional arrangement are all things can be said have contributed 
(Onyando et al. 2013, pp. 9-11).  
4.2 The institutional structure 
In light of these difficult challenges, both countries initiated political and 
institutional reforms of the water management sector in the 2000’s. By 
decentralizing decision making and devolving powers over water resources to 
WRM institutions, a fundamental change in the institutional framework has 
occurred. The Mara River Basin Management initiative, which will be analyzed in 
this thesis, operates within these institutional framings.  
In Kenya, the Water Act from 2002 is the general law that governs the 
management, conservation, and use of water resources. It promotes a 
decentralized system, where the Ministry of Water and Irrigation formulates the 
policies only, leaving the actual managing of all water resources to the Water 
Resources Management Authority (WRMA). The WRMA, in turn, delegates the 
administering and conflict resolution to the water resources users’ associations, 
which bring water users together in their respective regions of the country. In line 
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with this, the issues regarding the Mara River, such as the regulating and 
enforcing of WRM, are handled at the sub-regional level. For example, included 
in the set of laws regulating water resources is a system for controlling the water 
quality through issuing pollution permits at a fee for businesses polluting the river 
(Onyando et al. 2013, pp. 6-8). The National Water Policy of 2012 builds on 
lesson learned from the previous water policy and among other things 
emphasizes: greater autonomy for user groups, and the devolvement of functions 
to the lowest possible level, increased enforcement of pollution control through 
the polluter pays principle, and improved monitoring and evaluation systems. 
In Tanzania, the Ministry of Water is responsible for the WRM, and it is 
administered at the local level by District Councils and sub-basin water offices. 
The National Water Sector Development Strategy, in an attempt to streamline the 
institutional framework for WRM, clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders to ensure their participation at different levels (Onyando et al. 2013, 
pp. 6-8). Among other things, the National Water Policy of 2002 promotes: 
autonomy of water user groups, training staff at the lowest level, effective 
monitoring mechanisms, tariffs for over-use of water, and increased water supply 
for low income groups. Efforts are also made to make the water institutional 
structure less sensitive to natural disasters (Ministry of Water and Livestock 
Development 2002, pp. 32-47). The institutional structure in the two countries is 
further depicted in the appendix in section 8 of this thesis. 
4.3 The implementation of the Mara Initiative  
The Mara River Basin Management Initiative was carried out between 2003-
2012 and its’ overall goals was “improved quality and reliable quantity of water in 
the Mara River Basin for sustainable ecosystem functions and basic human 
needs”. The anticipated outputs were: (1) Strengthened capacity of community 
level representatives and their institutions to implement IWRM and income-
generating activities. (2) Enhanced knowledge and participation in IWRM through 
spreading lessons learned to partners and stakeholders. (3) To engage partners on 
the local, regional and national level to influence legislations for improved 
delivery of IWRM through lobbying. (4) Improved IWRM implementation at 
local, national and trans-boundary levels through strengthening sustainability, 
coordination and partnerships among IWRM institutions (Onyando et al. 2013, p. 
12).  
During the ten years of the initiative, 17 water resources users’ associations 
were formed in both Kenya and Tanzania, enhancing multi-stakeholder 
participation and decentralized systems of water governance, which is in line with 
both IWRM, and the national policies and institutions on the subject (WWF 
2010). Users’ associations were trained on registration procedures and 
formulating by-laws, and also participated in monitoring of the water quality and 
collecting water fees. This should make sure local users have the ability to sustain 
the initiative. Close collaboration between government agencies and regional 
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partners and their successful lobbying should also make the system more stable in 
the future. The users’ associations were trained on developing sub-catchment 
management plans for their local communities, and to present it to their local 
government and the Basin Water Board, which was a success (Onyando et al. 
2013, pp. 30-31). The newly formed users’ associations were a success, with more 
than 850 new members who wanted to act as representatives for their local 
communities. The effect is however not exclusively positive, since only 125 of 
these new members were regarded as active (Onyando et al. 2013, p 22). The 
formalization of the monitoring methods of the water quality was implemented 
with some success. 
The Water Users Associations got their formal legal recognition with the new 
national policies in the beginning of the 2000’s. This was also the start for many 
different projects in the River Basin, with the support from many international 
organisations and government, but under the leadership of the domestic 
governments in the two countries. In 2006, a trans-boundary WUA was 
established, to help grassroots cooperate and voice their concerns in the planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of trans-boundary agreements. The government 
water agencies in both countries made sure they were properly integrated in the 
management process (Global Water for Sustainability Program 2006).  
4.4 The outcome of the project 
A comprehensive document was produced containing key lessons learnt, among 
them the need for sustainable institutions and activities, the importance of 
systematic monitoring and simple methods for data collection, and the need for 
strong regional cooperation and the involvement of influential actors. Among the 
greatest achievements of the project was the improved legal and policy 
environment in line with the regulatory frameworks, as well as the establishment 
and formalization of WRM institutions to promote water governance, and 
increased local capacities to promote awareness of the threats to the basin 
(Onyando et al. 2013, pp. 22-25).  
There is evidence that some of the activities of the Mara Initiative has spread 
even after the project was finished. For example – in Tanzania, there is a 
community group which have continued with maintaining protected springs and 
establishing new nurseries for promoting bio-diversity. In the last phase of the 
project, great emphasis was put on the capacities of the users associations to 
become sustainable. All the action plans for the community groups have got 
clearly stated conservation priorities and activities for soil and water conservation. 
The projects success in creating local community groups has created much 
awareness amongst local people about the value of the river. This should enhance 
its’ conservation value, and contribute to the sustainability of the program 
(Onyando et al. 2013, pp. 34-35). Also, the Mara River Basin Management 
initiative, has implemented an environmental education program in a number of 
schools in Kenya and Tanzania ( p. 399). 
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In the efforts to make the project go on and disseminate into the future, efforts 
were made including helping community institutions to implement IWRM, and 
activating and sustaining stakeholder platforms for IWRM. In Kenya, but not in 
Tanzania, other government agencies on local, national, and trans-boundary level 
were engaged in order to incorporate experiences from the project to improve 
common-pool resources policies. Capacity needs assessments were also carried 
out, in order to ensure institutional stability (Onyando et al. 2013, pp. 30-31). 
People have volunteered to participate in IWRM activities such as collecting 
water samples. However, the lack of mechanisms to ensure that lead agencies 
meet their obligations, and the lack of incentives for volunteers to continue 
collecting data, can only be seen as a severe limitation, that might make actual 
institutionalization of these policies take longer (Onyando et al. 2013, p. 32). 
The Mara River Basin Initiative has strengthened capacities throughout the 
region. Respondents in group discussions have also been confident that the 
community awareness of the threats of the River Basin, such as deforestation, soil 
erosion and pollution. Through lobbying and advocacy, more people are now 
aware of the legal frameworks in place to promote IWRM in both countries. A 
more favourable environment for WRM institutions has been created, and 
stakeholders such as water users, government officers and private businesses have 
engaged in dialogue to support the implementation and ongoing engagement of 
actors. The development and signing of contractual agreements has endorsed and 
clarified the role of the IWRM institutions on different levels. Through formal 
users associations and clear rules, the process of IWRM can be said to have 
become institutionalized. By producing comprehensive documents key 
achievements and failures and why this is, lessons are learned for the future 
(Onyando et al. 2013, pp. 36-40). 
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5 Analysis 
In this analysis I go through the features of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework and connect it to the findings of the background of this 
thesis. I start by identifying the institutions, or rules-in-use, affecting the River 
Basin Management project. Continuing, I determine the action arena, and the 
actors and actions that makes it up. The analysis then continues to analysing 
outcomes of the project, and predict its’ sustainability. 
5.1 Rules-in-use 
There are rules-in-use affecting the River Basin Management that exist on a 
constitutional level, set by the government through the national water policy and 
water agencies. These are hard laws regulating the institutional structure through 
different agencies, as well as setting standards for pollution, and over-use of 
water. These rules also exist on the collective-choice level, where people share the 
same concepts on what needs to be done collectively in order to live up to the 
standards set by the government. On this level of analysis, rules are set by 
catchment- and sub-catchment groups, and by water users’ associations. They in 
turn, stipulate the opportunities and constraints for what can be decided on the 
operational level, were individuals make day-to-day decisions. Since I don’t have 
any first-hand sources it is hard for me to analyse the individual level of the 
institutional structure. The rest, however, I know enough about to proceed with 
the analysis and make conclusions. 
5.2 The Action Arena Analysis 
In order to find the structure affecting regularities in human behaviour when it 
comes to water resources management, the action situation has to be defined. This 
is easily made by using the seven criteria stated in the theory section of this thesis.  
• The participants of the Mara River Basin management project can be 
seen as everyone who to some extent use the river, either they need it 
to clench their thirst, water their crops, cook their meals or 
sustaining their livelihood through tourism activities. However, since 
over 1 million people live in the river basin, of obvious reasons not 
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all are active participants, who have changed their behaviour, or 
even aware of the problem or the project to fix it. 
• The positions filled by participants vary. Looking at the pictures in 
the appendix can help the reader get an idea of what roles exist – 
from policy maker, to government official, local representative, 
users’ association members down to individual users of the water. 
• The set of allowable actions refer to the rules-in-use, or what 
measures must be taken according to them. For example, 
implementation of a self-sustaining system of IWRM could mean 
corporate actors to cut their emissions, or people to stop washing 
their cars in the river. Giving up these actions would affect the 
project in a positive way. 
• The potential outcome of the Mara project has been thoroughly 
stated. The goal is increased water quality as well as quantity, 
increased bio-diversity and a higher degree of participation from 
stakeholders. If the actions are not taken, it would be devastating for 
all of the river basin, and for the people living there.  
• The level of control over choice from institutions is overall good. 
Many of the participants have changed the behaviour, and do take 
the intended actions, and there are sanctions in place to prevent 
people from not following the rules, such as tariffs for polluting or 
over-using. It is however hard for me to say how the sanctions, 
especially social sanctions, are enforced on the individual level. 
• The information available to participants about the structure of the 
action situation has increased tremendously due to the project. 
Awareness of the problems facing the river has spread through the 
involvement of the water user associations, as well as from 
government campaigns. 
• The benefits of acting in accordance with the IWRM practice that is 
stipulated through the water institutions are tremendous. Sustaining 
quantities and increasing quality of the water is closely associated 
with sustaining life and quality of life for so many people. The costs 
of implementation, monitoring and enforcing might be high – but the 
stakes are higher. 
 
This combined information makes it possible to initiate the analysis. There is a 
lot at stake if the water problems in the Mara Basin isn’t solved. There are over 
one million users dependent on the river, for many of whom it is the only thing 
standing between them and starvation or thirst. There is an institutional settings in 
place, with rules stipulated all the way from the government, through the local 
water associations, that affect how people act on a daily basis. The awareness of 
the problem and of the fact that it is necessary to look beyond short term personal 
interest and act collectively in order to solve it is crucial. Many more people are 
aware now, but all might not have incentives to comply, since the enforcement of 
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sanctions are not easy for me to be sure of. Also, incentives such as rewards for 
following through with obligations are, as far as I know not existent. This is why 
the spreading of knowledge is so important, it is what will create 
institutionalization of the rules and norms, sustaining them in the long run. 
The most important thing for an institutional design that wants to combat a 
common-resource problem – and the focus of this bachelor thesis – is that it is 
structured in a way that makes it self-sustainable, ensuring the ongoing dedication 
of participants. The Mara River Basin Management initiative has in many way 
succeeded in building strong and lasting institutions. The national policy acts are 
many, and emphasis is put on that conflict-solving as well as day-to-day 
implementation should be done in the lowest possible level, close to the users. 
5.3 The analysis of outcomes 
Now that the initial setting of the action arena is defined – it is time to move on to 
the eight criteria that makes institutions work effectively, and ultimately tells us 
whether there could be success in sustaining the IWRM policies: 
• The boundaries of the resource, and of  what individuals and actors 
get access to it is, as far as I can tell, good. The stage is clearly set 
with a system that stipulates on what level decisions are made, and 
what actors can decide. National policy is in place that should give 
users’ associations and other lower level groups a clear view of what 
they can do. 
• It is my impression that the rules in place correspond with the 
physical conditions and local needs. By decentralizing decision-
making and conflict-resolution, these things should be handled at the 
lowest level possible. Through interactions at the action arena, 
hopefully the communities themselves know the collective action 
solutions.  
• For effective governance of commons, arrangements should be in 
place to ensure that those affected by rules can participate in 
modifying them. Once again, the decentralization and stakeholder 
participation in decision making should make sure that this is what 
happens. The users’ associations have gotten training in registration 
procedures, as well as formulating by-laws. Participation is a central 
part of the IWRM strategy.   
• The monitoring of users’ behaviours are carried out by the users 
themselves, just as Elinor Ostrom recommends. To some extent we 
know this to be true. Users’ associations participate in collecting 
water fees, and the collection of water samples by volunteers is also 
way of monitoring the behaviour of others. All though there is a lack 
of incentives to carry this out, as has been discussed earlier, the 
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monitoring system is in place and hopefully will become more 
efficient as lessons are learned. When it comes to individual actions I 
can not really say what monitoring activities are going on. 
• There is a system of graduated sanctions in place for polluters and 
people who extract too much water from the river basin, where they 
pay fines for violating rules, in accordance with how much they 
pollute or use. 
• There should be accessible mechanisms at hand for solving conflicts, 
and I would say that there are. In Kenya, the Water Resources 
Management Authority has delegated the conflict resolution onto the 
users’ associations in the respective regions of the country. 
• According to the Institutional Analysis framework, users should be 
guaranteed the right to control their own institutions. One of the key 
parts of the water policies in both Kenya and Tanzania is that the 
central government have very little involvement in the operational 
level of water management. They set the policy but leave the 
administering, regulating, and enforcing WRM to local governments. 
This makes users closer to the power, which should give them some 
influence 
• The last criteria for effective IWRM is the notion that 
responsibilities should be shared in a nested system of multi-level 
governance of the common in question. As seen in the analysis of 
the seven previous bullet points – this is the case. The constitutional, 
collective-choice, and operational level are intertwined, and all share 
the responsibilities for implementing the IWRM strategy. 
 
As I have shown, the Mara River Basin Management Initiative has at least 
some of the characteristics of all of these criteria. This gives incentives for users 
to go together and, through collective action, effectively manage the resource.  
A part of Ostroms’ analysis of effective institutional settings that must not be 
left out, is looking at alternative variables that have to do with the allocation of 
resources associated with the WRM institutions. Economic efficiency is increased 
when there are economic incentives to comply with rules. Water user costs, and 
pollution tariffs are such policies that are in place in the Mara basin. This makes 
the institutional structure good for efficiency, but is it also fair? With regard to 
redistributional equity, I would say yes – as long as the fee is reasonable. If you 
take something away from the environment, you should give something in return. 
If equity is the goal it depends on the structure of rules. Fees are paid by someone 
who over-uses water or pollutes the river basin. The poor usually don’t have 
much, and don’t consume much either - so as long as they get their water for the 
day, the system can be said to be equitable as well. 
Proceeding the analysis, is there accountability in the institutional system? 
Again, I would say yes. As long as users’ groups work as they should they have a 
certain degree of self-determination, and they can contact authorities and let them 
know of their preferences. When it comes to the demand that institutions should 
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comply with general morality, so that you can’t cheat the system for your own 
personal gain? I am sure you can, but the enforcement mechanisms mentioned are 
in place to prevent that from happening. I have not however found any evidence 
of a system that rewards you for following through with your obligations. I guess 
being part of a collective action for the common good must be reward enough. 
The last thing in this analysis is whether or not the institutional system is 
adaptable to changes in the environment. As I said in the background for this 
analysis, Tanzania are preparing there institutions for just that (Ostrom 2007, pp. 
34-35). 
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6 Conclusions 
I now conclude this institutional analysis of the Mara River Basin Management 
Initiative, by going through some of the reoccurring features in the analysis, 
connect the dots, and hold a short discussion on its’ applicability on other water 
management projects.   
The Mara River basin is in general degradation. The river supports over 1 
million people who live in the area, but has poor water quality, and during dry 
season when water is scarce, conflicts tend to arise. The reasons for this are many, 
including over-abstraction of water, pollution, as well as the historically weak 
institutional and legal arrangements. In order to combat this, in the beginning of 
the new millennium, the Mara River Basin Management Initiative was initiated. 
Its’ goals were set: more water, better water, increased bio-diversity, and 
increased participation. About the same time, the governments of Kenya and 
Tanzania implemented National Water Policies in order to strengthen water 
institutions. The policies stipulated that the administering of the water sector 
should be conducted on the lowest level possible. The responsibility for much of 
this was put on the newly formed regional water users’ associations, which 
members were trained in governing water, and were given the authority to help 
solve conflicts that could arise. The governments also decided on penalty fees for 
using too much water or polluting the river, which vary with how much harm was 
done. The users’ associations were in charge of enforcing these rules, as well as 
monitoring and collecting data on how the water quality progressed. The users’ 
associations also helped spread the word to other users of the river, explaining to 
them the magnitude of the problem, what needed to be done and that the only way 
to get it done was through collectively changing their behaviour. 
This whole last paragraph is a depiction of what Elinor Ostrom calls an action 
arena, where actors meet to solve problems, and the structure of the action 
situation that is in the arena. Every single one of the actions taken in the action 
situation above are in line with Ostroms’ idea of how a common-user resource is 
best governed. We have the multiple action levels working together, jointly 
responsible for managing the water resource, tangled together in a net of 
interdependencies. Where the government decides the constitutional rules, which 
says what the users’ associations can and can not do on the collective-choice 
level. They in turn, don’t have the power of making laws, but through interactions 
and information, they can change the working rules that people live by that decide 
how they act down on the operational level. When this information has become 
common knowledge, and people everywhere act after these working rules, the 
action has become institutionalized – and we’ve created a self-sustaining 
institutional structure. 
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I am off course stretching the analogy way to far here. It is not possible for me 
to say exactly how the implementation of IWRM promote a sustainable 
institutional design. But I can conclude that many of the features in the Integrated 
Water Resources Management process that the Mara River case represents vital 
aspects of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Answering my 
question: it does promote a sustainable institutional design – in the way that it 
allows users to make decisions themselves, and in the way that it promotes 
learning and spreading of knowledge, and in the way that it has enforcement 
mechanism in order for people to follow the rules.  
I am the first one to admit that the data collected not is enough for an 
understanding of  how individuals act and why. Participant interviews would 
probably have been the only way to really get to know the working rules of 
people. The enforcement mechanisms for cheaters and incentives to be good could 
have been stronger, and there are off course a hundred other factors that are left 
out of the analysis, because I am not aware of them. But I have concluded that the 
institutions are strong, since they fitted well into the framework. And I do think I 
have managed to say something meaningful on the collective-action level, and 
that performing the IAD-analysis has proved to be very favourable for Integrated 
Water Resources Management projects. And yes, I do believe the result it is 
applicable to other cases to some extent. The IWRM process is more and more 
standardized, with participation and multi-level governance as an important part. I 
guess I will just have to do an analysis of another project some time in the future, 
with participants interviews on the bank of the river. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Institutional arrangements for WRM in Tanzania 
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8.2 Institutional arrangements for WRM in Kenya 
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